Wednesday 5 January 2022

2021 Review / December portfolio update

It's now about four and a half years since I started tracking my investing on this blog. Over that time, I've been lucky enough to grow my investments at 18.50% per year — a result that is well in excess of my initial expectations.

I'm a much better investor than when I started, but I still make a lot of stupid mistakes. There's plenty of room for improvement, which is encouraging, and I'm confident I'll continue to do well by sticking to my process and staying in my circle of competence (which is small, but growing ever so slightly over time).

For the year to December 31, 2021, my PA gained 11.28%, while my benchmark, the S&P/ASX 200 Franking Credit Adjusted Annual Total Return Index (Tax-Exempt), rose 18.33%. 

Results since inception (PA)

DatePortfolioReturnBenchmarkReturn
August 3, 20171.0061,250.80
December 31, 20171.06756.75%66,215.658.11%
December 31, 20181.176010.16%69,053.504.29%
December 31, 20191.426821.33%81,712.7218.33%
December 31, 20201.900833.22%83,917.902.70%
December 31, 20212.115211.28%99,298.2118.33%
(CAGR)18.50%11.57%

Overall, I'm very satisfied with my 2021. While I underperformed my benchmark, I've had a remarkable run since 2017 and an 11% year is nothing to complain about.

What went wrong in 2021

I lost some money getting out of a position in Techno Quartz (TSE:5217), a company that sells quartz glass products for use in the semiconductor industry. While the company looks cheap, I realised some problems with my thesis and exited the position at a small loss. I consider Techno Quartz my biggest mistake of 2021. It was a mistake of my process, and it could have cost me a huge amount of money due to the size of the position. Thankfully, this lesson wasn't too expensive. However, Techno Quartz has continued to do well, and it ended the year well above my exit price. 

My other big losers were Chen Hsong (average purchase price of ~2.68) which shot up from 2.30 to ~3.50 in November but ended the year at 2.40, and Destination XL. Both companies seem very cheap to me, and both remain in the portfolio.

Another costly mistake was selling my position in Guillemot in early January. At the time, the shares were still cheap, but I thought Haier offered a better opportunity. Over the short term, Haier did better, but Guillemot ended the year ~70% above my exit price. You can't get them all right, but Guillemot was a good, cheap business and I should have been more reluctant to let it go. Let's hope Haier makes up the deficit in future.

What went right in 2021

Most of my winners were cheap industrial stocks in Asia. Boustead Projects started the year at 0.81 and I was able to sell most of my holding at 1.30 in early August, prior to the company paying a special dividend. The gain including dividends was around 66% and Boustead has tracked lower over the year.

I had decent positions in TTJ Holdings and Analogue Holdings, which gained 29% and 58% respectively including dividends. Pleasingly, these gains came without much risk, and both companies remain cheap today. Million Hope Holdings, a smaller position, gained 41%.

Looking ahead to 2022

It's been useful to spend some time reading and thinking over the summer, and I've had a lot to reflect on. In 2022, I have a few areas I'd like to improve on when it comes to investing. For starters, I'd like to be more patient. I tend to get a bit trigger happy when I have cash on hand and make rushed decisions or mistakes. The bar for new investments should be high and I need to be more comfortable holding cash when I don't have good alternatives. I want to trade less, and make fewer decisions overall. Interestingly, if I took my portfolio at the start of the year and simply held it, I would have earned 19.05%. While this doesn't account for additions over the course of 2021, it demonstrates that trading in and out of positions likely destroyed value over the year.

 In terms of research, I'd like to place more emphasis on capital management. Historically, I have tended to own stocks with a lot of cash or assets on the balance sheet. While there are benefits to conservative balance sheets, there are also at least two key problems to these situations. The first is that stocks that look optically cheap on an EV basis can lead to poor returns. This is a lesson I've learned through experience but it's also something that Joel Greenblatt has discussed.

The stock is at $6 with $5 in cash and the stock is going to $7 in two years. But you are laying out $6 and it is only going to $7. The EV doubles (100%) but your return is 8% annually compounded over two years.

Another issue can arise when you attribute value to cash on the balance sheet, only to see that value destroyed by poor capital allocation. For example, TTJ Holdings has destroyed value with M&A historically. While I continue to hold TTJ at current prices, I would likely sell my position immediately should management embark on new M&A that's not aligned with its core steel business. In short, finding a company trading at a low value in relation to its cash or investments is not enough: you also need a clear thesis around how that capital will be used or distributed. 

Fishing where the fish are

At the Daily Journal annual meeting in 2020, Charlie Munger had some timeless advice for investors.
I have a friend who’s a fisherman he says, “I have a simple rule for success in fishing. Fish where the fish are.” You want to fish where the bargains are. That simple. If the fishing is really lousy where you are you should probably look for another place to fish.
Lately, I have been finding a lot of "fish" in Hong Kong. Consider for a moment that the S&P 500 gained ~27% in 2021 while the Hang Seng fell ~15%. Besides the political situation in Hong Kong, there has been the fallout from China's crackdown on tech companies and the Evergrande crisis. For many fund managers, Hong Kong and China seems to be a no-go at the moment. Just look at what's happened to Hamish Douglass and Magellan. The result is an incredibly cheap HK stock market.
For those unfamiliar with investing in small companies in HK (or Asia generally), a word of warning: you will encounter dodgy controlling shareholders, poor corporate governance and value traps. However, for those willing to do a bit of digging, there are bargains to be found. David Webb — a famous HK small cap investor with an astonishing track record — wrote in June 2020 that "many of these stocks are cheaper on fundamentals than they have been in a decade". For those interested in looking at interesting HK situations, I would suggest taking a look at Webb's holdings.

The results of my private investment account and SMSF are summarised in the table below. The portfolios are constructed differently and performance will vary. I don't account for cash balances in my PA but I do in my SMSF.

My PA was up 3.23% in October, up 0.64% in November and down 1.79% in December. The cumulative return for the period was 2.03%. The S&P/ASX 200 Franking Credit Adjusted Annual Total Return Index (Tax-Exempt) gained 2.09% over the same period.


August 3, 2017
December 31, 2021
Since July 1, 2021
Since Inception
Annualised
G&W Portfolio
1.0000
2.1152
-5.56%
111.52%
18.50%
Benchmark (SPAX2F0)
61,250.80
99,298.21
4.81%
62.12%
11.57%

My SMSF gained 6.66% in October, gained 3.08% in November and fell 4.16% in December. The cumulative return for the period was 5.37%. 


August 4, 2021
December 31, 2021
Since August 4, 2021
Since Inception
Annualised
G&W SMSF
1.0000
1.0166
1.66%        
1.66%
4.12%
Benchmark (SPAX2F0)
98,123.18
99,298.21

1.20%
1.20%
2.96%

Saturday 1 January 2022

Yorkey Optical (HK:2788)

Yorkey Optical International (Cayman) Ltd (HK:2788) is a manufacturer of components for the camera industry listed in Hong Kong. I stumbled across the company while looking at the holdings of David Webb, a HK-based value investor and activist. 

The investment thesis is quite simple. 

  1. Yorkey currently trades at 0.81 HKD. 
  2. Asia Optical International Ltd, Yorkey's largest shareholder, has made a privatisation offer at 0.88 HKD per share. 
  3. David Webb can block the deal as he holds more than 10 per cent of the "independent shares". 
  4. It's likely the offer will be increased due to Webb's blocking stake and positive developments since the offer was announced.

On December 15, following revaluation of its properties, Yorkey announced that its unaudited NAV as of October 31 was 99.45m USD (~737m HKD) or 0.94 HKD per share. By comparison, Yorkey's unaudited NAV per share at June 30 — the latest reporting period prior to the privatisation offer — was 0.804 HKD per share. 

In other words:

  • The current offer of 0.88 HKD represents a 6.4% discount to the company's unaudited NAV at October 31
  • The revised NAV of 0.94 HKD per share represents a 16.9% increase to the June 30 asset value listed in the initial offer documents

It therefore seems highly likely Asia Optical's offer will be unacceptable to Webb, who has already threatened to exercise his veto power.

The Offeror has left room to increase the bid after Yorkey has obtained the expected valuation reports, before the offer document is posted. Webb-site Founder David Webb currently holds more than 10% of the independent shares, sufficient to block the privatisation, so let's hope that does not become necessary and the Yorkey bar is substantially raised for a happy ending.

Importantly, David Webb seems to think that Yorkey's true NAV could be even higher. He believes Yorkey's property in Dongguan, China, could be worth $30m USD based on the disclosed market value of a comparable nearby property held by HK-listed Chung's China Investments Ltd (HK:298). Jones Lang LaSalle, Yorkey's appointed appraiser, valued this property at $12.6m USD, using a "cost approach with reference to … depreciated replacement cost". 

Additionally, the JLL valuations of Yorkey's Hong Kong properties are based on smaller floor areas than previously disclosed, as can be seen in the table below. I'm not sure of the reason for this, but it could be another point of contention.
 
PropertyGross floor area (sqm)Appraised value (USD)Webb valueNotes
An industrial complex located at the northern side of Dezheng Middle Road, Chang’an Town, Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, The PRC40,13812.6030.61
Workshops 1,2,3 and 4 with lavatories on 6/F of Block A and Car Park No. C17 and L2 on 2/F Goldfield Industrial Centre, No.1 Sui Wo Road, Sha Tin, New Territories, Hong Kong4963.486.45Gross floor area in prospectus was 788.28 square metres; appraisal notes that the saleable area of industrial units was only 495.54 square metres. Webb's value is based on floor area used in prospectus.
Unit 1-9 on 26/F and flat roof above 26/F CRE Centre 889 Cheung Sha, Wan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong

93/1758 shares of and in The New Kowloon Inland Lot. 5540
5627.117.07Gross floor area in acquisition announcement was 822.56 square metres; appraisal notes that the saleable area of industrial units was only 561.87 square metres. Webb's value is based on floor area used in prospectus.
Total
23.1944.1320.94m difference. If we take Webb's value for the PRC property and the appraised values for HK properties, the difference is 18m.

The difference between the two valuations is 20.95m USD or 0.20 HKD per share. If we are to believe David Webb, even the 0.94 HKD NAV could be significantly understating Yorkey's true asset value.

There is clear strategic rationale for the acquirer: 
  1. Asia Optical is a connected person of Yorkey's under HK listing rules, and also a major customer. By taking Yorkey private, Asia Optical can avoid regulatory issues and save on costs related to Yorkey's dual HK and Taiwan listings. 
  2. Yorkey is stuffed full of cash. As of June 30, it had $78m USD in net cash, equivalent to roughly 0.75 HKD per share (~88% of the current 0.88 HKD offer).
  3. Asia Optical trades at over 2x price to book compared to Yorkey which is currently trading below NAV.
  4. As discussed above, there could be hidden value in the properties
Asia Optical has financing for the deal from a HK bank. Considering Asia Optical's balance sheet and Yorkey's cash pile, it's hard to see any problems arising with financing.

Since the privatisation was proposed, Yorkey has announced a profit upgrade that will be included in the scheme documents sent to shareholders. For the nine months to September 30, 2021, Yorkey is expected to record a consolidated profit of not more than $2.89m USD. Yorkey's interim report shows that the company earned only $0.79m USD for the first six months of the year, so there has been a strong uptick in business in the third quarter.

Before we look at the potential outcomes, it's important to consider the downside. Should the deal fail, I've assumed that the stock will trade at 0.50 HKD, roughly the average of the closing prices for the 180 days before the privatisation offer was announced. At that price, Yorkey seems very cheap, considering the company's cash position and the improvement in recent results. The price would represent a 47% discount to 0.94 HKD unaudited NAV per share as of October 31.

Yorkey's policy is to pay out 70% of earnings as dividends and prior to COVID the payout ratio exceeded this benchmark. In FY19, for example, Yorkey paid out 0.044 HKD per share on earnings of 0.048 HKD, a payout ratio of 92%. So you could get some dividends, too. Yorkey was also buying back shares before the privatisation was announced, which is a positive. However, it's unlikely that shareholders will see any of the cash on the balance sheet if the privatisation fails. Yorkey has continued to hold excessive amounts of cash despite repeated calls from David Webb for special dividends. Importantly, if Webb vetoes the deal, it seems to me that Yorkey will likely trade above 0.50 HKD considering there is an interested buyer. Based on all of this information, I think 0.50 HKD is a conservative estimate for Yorkey's value in the event the deal breaks. 

It seems Asia Optical has scope to improve the bid and would seek to do so rather than have the deal fall through. I have outlined my thinking of the probabilities in the table below.

ProbabilityOutcomeValue
Current offer is accepted10.00%0.880.088
Deal gets done at revised NAV40.00%0.940.376
Deal gets bumped30.00%1.000.300
Webb gets his price5.00%1.190.060
Deal gets killed15.00%0.500.075
Total0.8985

Based on this, we get a blended value of 0.8985 HKD per share — representing ~11% upside from today's price. 

The long-stop date for the deal is April 13. If we assume the scheme consideration is paid by June 30 (six months from today) the annualised return based on the blended price would be ~22%. If we get the current offer of 0.88 HKD, the annualised return would be ~17.5%; if the deal is bumped to 0.94 HKD, the annualised return would be 32.54%. This seems attractive on a risk-adjusted basis and I've parked about 5% of my net worth in Yorkey. I'm treating the position as a cash alternative and I'd be happy to redeploy the money into a longer-term investment should opportunity arise.

Risks:
  • David Webb and Asia Optical can't find an acceptable compromise
  • Some legal/regulatory conditions remain to be fulfilled or waived
  • Currency risk